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The concern for witness reliability is not new to Evidence law.
Since the Anglo-American adversarial system relies for accurate factfinding upon jurors who have no independent knowledge of the facts
at issue, it is important for witnesses supplying evidence that will form
1
the basis of such fact-finding to be reliable. Evidentiary submissions
2
3
that raise issues of hearsay, first-hand knowledge, original
4
documents, and others invoke rules that reflect a concern about
reliability. Expert testimony raises the same concern under Rule
5
702.
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1
RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES § 204 (3d ed.
2002).
2
See FED. R. EVID. art. VIII, advisory committee’s introductory note (noting as a
purpose of the hearsay rule “to encourage the witness to do his best with respect to
each of [the factors of perception, memory, narration, and sincerity], and to expose
any inaccuracies which may enter in”).
3
See FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (citing McCormick for the
following passage in describing the justification for the rule: “‘[T]he rule requiring
that a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have
had an opportunity to observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a ‘most
pervasive manifestation’ of the common law insistence upon ‘the most reliable
sources of information.’”).
4
See FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee’s note (noting that the best evidence
“afforded substantial guarantees against inaccuracies and fraud”); see also 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 229 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (noting “the danger
of mistransmitting critical facts which accompanies the use of written copies or
recollection”).
5
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993) (noting
the concern of the common law with reliable sources of information as manifested in
the personal knowledge and hearsay rules and explaining that the reliability
requirement in 702 grows out of a concern about the wide latitude permitted the
expert witness whose opinions need not be based on firsthand knowledge or
observation).
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In any of these contexts, perfectly reliable evidence would justify
the jury’s absolute confidence in the truth of its contents and provide
complete support for reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
6
evidence. Some cross-examination and all impeachment are efforts
to diminish the perceived reliability of evidence in the hope that a
7
fact-finder will discount its value.
THE LAW
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
8
9
10
Inc., General Electric Co. v. Joiner, and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
and Congress in Rule 702 as amended in 2000, have attempted to
delineate the parameters of reliable expert testimony. Even before
the 2000 amendments the concept of reliability was embedded in
Rule 702. That rule permitted an expert to give helpful scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge. It is the concept of
knowledge in Rule 702 that embodied the idea of reliability as truth.
The Supreme Court unearthed the buried idea of reliability in
11
Daubert.
In dispelling the notion of general acceptance as a
prerequisite to the admissibility of scientific evidence, the Court
expressed the assurance that admissibility of scientific evidence was
12
not unlimited. It spelled out a judge’s screening function in such
cases as involving the dual determination of relevancy and
13
reliability. Since Daubert involved scientific evidence, the Court in
the following terms discerned the reliability requirement in 702’s
language sanctioning expert testimony about scientific knowledge:
The subject of an expert’s testimony must be “scientific . . .
knowledge.” The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the
6

See 13 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 562 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “reliable”
as “1.a. That may be relied upon; in which reliance or confidence may be put;
trustworthy, safe, sure”).
It also defines “trust” as “[c]onfidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute
of a person or thing, or the truth of a statement . . . .” 18 Id. at 623.
7
See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig. (Paoli II), 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994)
(stating that credibility may have a bearing on the reliability of expert testimony);
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 108-09, 389-90.
8
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
9
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
10
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
11
But see Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting The Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2015 (1994) (noting that the reliability approach developed
five to seven years after the enactment of the rules and commenting that “there is an
element of magic in the [Daubert] Court’s ‘discovery’ of [the reliability] analysis in
Rule 702’s phrase ‘scientific knowledge’”).
12
509 U.S. at 589.
13
Id.
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methods and procedures of science.
Similarly, the word
“knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation. The term “applies to any body of
known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or
14
accepted as truths on good grounds.”

That the “good grounds” (reliability) supporting scientific knowledge
are derived from the scientific method is expressed as follows:
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed
testimony must be supported by an appropriate validation—i.e.,
“good grounds,” based on what is known.
In short, the
requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific
15
knowledge” establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability.

In Daubert, the Court is careful to make it clear that its discussion
centered upon scientific rather than “technical or other specialized
16
knowledge.”
However, a change in the adjective modifying
knowledge does not change the central concern of reliability—that
such knowledge (scientific, technical or specialized other) be capable
of acceptance as truth on good grounds. It also seems clear that the
Daubert factors showing scientific reliability—testability, peer review,
error rate, controlling standards, and general acceptance—might
prove useful individually, collectively, or in some combination with
other factors in determining the reliability of technical or other
17
specialized knowledge. Always, the point of the inquiry is whether
the knowledge in question is capable of acceptance as truth on good
grounds.
The district court in Joiner found that the opinions of plaintiff’s
18
experts were not based on reliable scientific knowledge.
In the
court’s view the animal and epidemiological studies relied upon by
these experts to show a link between the plaintiff’s exposure to PCBs
and his development of small cell lung cancer did not sufficiently
19
support the opinions. Under an “abuse of discretion” standard the
Supreme Court upheld the district court’s ruling of inadmissibility.
The Court affirmed the district court’s discretion to find an expert’s
opinion to be an unsupported assertion, where “too great an
analytical gap [exists] between the data and the opinion proffered,”
14

Id. at 589-90 (footnote and citations omitted).
Id. at 590 (footnote omitted).
16
Id. n.8.
17
See id. at 593-94. This point seems adumbrated in the Court’s emphasis on the
flexibility of the reliability inquiry under Rule 702. Id. at 594.
18
522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997).
19
Id. at 144-45.
15
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and said that “abuse of discretion” is the proper standard whether the
20
trial court’s decision is to admit or exclude scientific evidence.
21
In Kumho, the adjective modifying “knowledge” changed.
Unlike Daubert and Joiner where the issues involved the reliability of
scientific evidence, Kumho considered the reliability of non-scientific
22
expert testimony. For reasons grounded in the language of Rule
23
24
702, the rationale of the reliability element of the rule, and the
difficulty of distinguishing between “scientific” on the one hand and
“technical or other specialized knowledge” on the other, the Court
held that the judge’s gatekeeping function applied to all expert
testimony. To reinforce this conclusion, the Court noted the
common approach among all experts to “tie observations to
conclusions through . . . ‘general truths derived from . . . specialized
experience’” and the role of the judge’s reliability determination in
25
helping the jury evaluate that “foreign experience.”
Elaborating
upon the requirements of Rule 702 the Court said:
The Rule, in respect to all such matters, “establishes a standard of
evidentiary reliability.” It “requires a valid . . . connection to the
pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.” And where
such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their
application are called sufficiently into question, the judge must
determine whether the testimony has “a reliable basis in the
26
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.”

The Court also reaffirmed the flexibility of the reliability
determination, the trial court’s discretion to consider one or more of
the Daubert factors or others in reaching the reliability determination,
and the applicability of Joiner’s abuse of discretion standard to trial
20

Id. at 146.
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
22
Id. at 141.
23
In capturing the essence of the Daubert analysis of reliability, the Court focused
as follows on the noun, knowledge, rather than the adjective, scientific, in Rule 702:
In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule’s word “knowledge,”
not the words (like “scientific”) that modify that word, that “establishes
a standard of evidentiary reliability.” . . . Hence, as a matter of
language, the Rule applies its reliability standard to all “scientific,”
“technical,” or “other specialized” matters within its scope.
Id. at 147.
24
On this point the Court reiterated the expert witness’s “testimonial latitude”
that is “unavailable to other witnesses on the ‘assumption that the expert’s opinion
will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.’” Id. at
138 (citations omitted).
25
Id. at 148-49 (quoting from Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations
Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901)).
26
Id. at 149 (internal citations omitted).
21
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27

court reliability rulings.
Whether the engineering testimony of Kumho was reliable and
capable of acceptance as truth on good grounds depended on the
nature of the opinion and its basis. The expert in Kumho had
concluded that a defect rather than misuse in the right rear tire of
the minivan that plaintiff had been driving caused it to blow out,
killing one passenger and severely injuring others. The issue boiled
down to whether overdeflection (misuse) or a defect had caused the
tread of the tire to separate from the inner steel-belted carcass,
causing the blow-out. The expert asserted the latter cause. In
support of this opinion the expert set forth both a general theory and
a specific theory. The general theory held that in the absence of
abuse B determined by the expert’s visual and tactile inspection of
the tire B such a separation is caused by a defect. Under the specific
theory, unless two of four possible signs of misuse (overdeflection)
could be shown, a conclusion that a defect caused the blowout must
28
follow.
In deciding to affirm the district court’s finding that the expert’s
testimony was not reliable, the Court focused its critical analysis on
the grounds of the expert’s conclusion. It cited evidence in the
record that raised doubts about the reliability of the expert’s use of
29
the two-factor test and visual/tactile inspection. Some aspects of this
30
evidence bore upon the credibility of the witness. Others focused
31
on a critique of the expert’s stated methodology. After considering
27

Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42.
Id. at 143, 154. The expert cited as the symptoms of overdeflection:
(a) tread wear on the tire’s shoulder that is greater than the tread wear
along the tire’s center . . . (b) signs of a “bead groove,” where the beads
have been pushed too hard against the bead seat on the inside of the
tire’s rim, . . . (c) sidewalls of the tire with physical signs of
deterioration, such a discoloration, . . . (d) marks on the tire’s rim
flange.
Id. at 144.
29
Id. at 154-57.
30
For example, the Court noted the inconsistency between the expert’s claim
that visual/tactile inspection permitted him “to ascertain with some certainty the
abuse-related significance of minute shoulder/center relative tread wear differences,
but insufficiently precise to tell ‘with any certainty’ from the tread wear whether a
tire had traveled less than 10,000 or more than 50,000 miles.” Id. at 155. It also
noted the insufficiency of the expert’s opportunity to observe the tire, having
inspected it for the first time and for only a few hours on the morning of the
deposition and the inconsistencies between the expert’s signed report and his
deposition and the contradiction between the expert’s report on tread depth and an
opposing expert’s undisputed measurements. Id.
31
The Court noted the “‘subjective[ness]’ of his mode of analysis in response to
questions seeking specific information regarding how he could differentiate between
28
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whether the expert’s methodology could withstand scrutiny on its
own terms, the Court also approved of the trial court’s next steps of
determining whether any of the Daubert factors pointed to reliability,
whether the trial court’s own analysis “‘revealed . . . countervailing
factors operating in favor of admissibility which could outweigh those
32
identified in Daubert,’” and whether the parties cited any factors
33
favoring admissibility. In its independent assessment of whether the
trial court had abused its discretion by finding the expert’s testimony
unreliable, the Court compared the expert’s methodology to that
used by other experts in the industry. It also considered any
validation of the expert’s approach in the literature of the field, and
whether the expert’s methodology reflected “the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
34
relevant field.” In Kumho, the Court sanctioned an approach to
determining the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony that
tested whether the opinion was capable of acceptance as truth on
good grounds. The grounds included the expert’s credibility, the
soundness and application of his methodology, the Daubert factors,
and any other relevant factors.
After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert, Joiner, and
Kumho, Congress amended Rule 702, effective 2000, as follows to
incorporate the teachings of Daubert and Kumho:
If scientific, technical, other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
35
reliably to the facts of the case.

The legislative history contained in the Advisory Committee Note
(“CAN”) makes it clear that the amendment was intended to affirm
“the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and [provide] some general
standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and

a tire that actually had been overdeflected and a tire that merely looked as though it
had been” his failure to examine many similar tires to determine the significance of
the bead groove even though he testified that such an examination would have been
appropriate. Id. at 155.
32
Id. at 156.
33
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156.
34
Id. at 152.
35
FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added to highlight amended provisions).
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helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.” The ACN also reiterates
Kumho’s holding that the gatekeeper function is applicable to
scientific as well as non-scientific expert testimony. However, the
drafters of the amendment recognized that the reliability
determination would vary depending upon the nature of the
proffered expertise, saying the following:
Some types of expert testimony will be more objectively verifiable,
and subject to the expectations of falsifiability, peer review, and
publication, than others. Some types of expert testimony will not
rely on anything like a scientific method, and so will have to be
evaluated by reference to other standard principles attendant to
the particular area of expertise. The trial judge in all cases of
proffered expert testimony must find that it is properly grounded,
37
well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted.

In addition, the ACN endorses not only the Daubert factors for
assessing reliability, but also cites other factors used by courts and
38
other uncited factors as relevant to the determination.
The Supreme Court cases and the Rule 702 amendment and
legislative history devote much attention to the judge’s performance
of the Rule 104(a) gatekeeping function of determining the
reliability of expert testimony. However, they only hint at how to
recognize reliability for purposes of fulfilling the function. Noting
that the proponent’s burden is demonstrating “by a preponderance
of evidence that [experts’] opinions are reliable rather than ‘correct,’
the ACN of the Rule 702 amendments quotes with approval a judicial
statement that the “evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower
than the merits standard of correctness.” The ACN also explains that
“the rejection of expert testimony should be the exception rather
than the rule,” citing Daubert language suggesting that “shaky” expert
testimony should be admitted and subjected to attack by the
adversarial elements of cross-examination, conflicting evidence, and
the burden of proof. The reliability determination is not to be
confused with the sufficiency determination that the trial judge bases
39
on the record as a whole. The dual obligations of reliability and
36

FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to amended Rule 702.
Id.
38
Some of these factors are whether the testimony grows out of research
conducted independent of litigation, whether the expert’s extrapolation from an
accepted premise is unjustifiably broad, whether the expert has accounted for
obvious alternative explanations, whether the expert’s degree of care matches that of
his professional practice, whether the expertise is recognized as giving reliable
opinions such as those offered by the expert. Id.
39
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility
of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 189 (2003).
37
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relevancy determinations under Rule 702 make it clear that reliability
is different from relevancy. Hence, the low standard of relevancy will
40
not suffice to establish reliability.
Like Rule 403, the reliability determination seems to require
trial judges to demand more of expert testimony than simple
relevancy. Yet the Court in Daubert does not explicitly tie the
reliability determination to 403 analysis—it simply instructs trial
judges to be “mindful of other applicable rules.” However, the Court
specifically cites Rule 403 and endorses Judge Weinstein’s observation
that Rule 403 gives judges more control over expert witnesses than
laywitnesses because of the potential prejudice associated with the
41
former.
Before the Court decided Daubert, Judge Becker had discussed
42
the relationship between 702 and 403 in United States v. Downing, a
case relied upon by the Daubert Court. In Downing, Judge Becker said
the following:
After assessing the reliability of the evidence, the court must also
weigh any danger that the evidence might confuse or mislead the
jury. It may seem paradoxical to suggest that scientific evidence
based on principles bearing substantial indicia of reliability could
confuse rather than assist the jury, but we do not doubt that this
may be so, in some cases. One example might involve a
technique which has “assume[d] a posture of mythic infallibility”
among lay persons, or at least one whose shortcomings are, for
some reason, unlikely to be effectively communicated to the jury.
The degree to which an unwarranted “aura of reliability” attaches
to scientific evidence will naturally vary with the type of
43
evidence.

Later in the Downing decision, the court acknowledged that its 702
analysis incorporated “to some extent a consideration of the dangers,
particularly the danger of unfair prejudice, enumerated in Fed. R.
44
Evid. 403.”
In a post-Daubert case, In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB
45
Litigation (Paoli II), Judge Becker recalled his pre-Daubert discussion
in Downing of the relationship between 702 and 403, saying that the
point in Downing was that 702 “partly incorporates Rule 403 analysis
40

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 reads, “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
41
509 U.S. at 595.
42
753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
43
Id. at 1239 (internal citations omitted).
44
Id. at 1242.
45
35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994).
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but leaves some room for Rule 403 to operate independently.” He
went on to describe how the Daubert Court treated the Downing view
of this relationship:
In Daubert, the Supreme Court seems to have inverted our view
that much of Rule 403 analysis conflates into Rule 702; rather the
Court seems to have conflated the confusion/overwhelming
impact prong of our Rule 702 analysis into its Rule 403 analysis.
The Daubert Court did not mention the confusion/overwhelming
prong when discussing Rule 702 but did provide support for
application of essentially similar analysis under the rubric of Rule
47
403.

Since degree of reliability has a bearing upon the probative
value of expert testimony, and the risk of misleading the jury and
other 403 factors might lead to exclusion under Rule 403 as noted by
the Court in Daubert, the reliability determination may simply fold
48
into the 403 analysis creating a sliding scale of reliability under 702.
Under this approach, if the degree of reliability (probative value)
sufficiently offsets the Rule 403 risks associated with the expert
testimony, the evidence is reliable enough to be admissible under
403. Even expert testimony of the highest risk would not lead to
49
exclusion if the expert testimony were highly reliable.
This
determination would be consistent with the demand for more than
simple relevancy in reaching reliability determinations and the need
to observe the distinction between reliability and sufficiency.
Although the Court in Daubert perceives a relationship between 403
and the reliability determination under 702 and moves it, perhaps,
one step beyond Downing, the recognition of reliability as a factor in
determining the probative value of this species of evidence under 403
analysis remains underdeveloped.
THE ARGUMENTS
In Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, Professor Dale Nance’s
46

Judge Becker used as an example of this relationship the exclusion of “an
expert’s critique of eyewitness testimony even though the critique met the
requirements of Rule 702 if there was evidence of defendant’s guilt other than
eyewitness testimony which would make efforts to criticize eyewitness testimony a
waste of time.” Id. at 746.
47
Id. at 746-47.
48
See Calvin William Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes
Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 585-89 (1984)
(describing proof of other crimes as a sliding scale of proof).
49
See Newell H. Blakely, Article IV: Relevancy and Its Limits, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 281,
317 (1993) (including a table showing high probative value offsetting high, mid, or
low prejudice).
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project is to provide “a careful analysis of the contours and functions
of the reliability concept . . . and its relationship to the purposes of
50
admissibility rules.”
He argues generally that “courts and
commentators should disavow an all-or-nothing concept of reliability”
in favor of a concept that recognizes reliability as a non-binary
variable characteristic, thus recognizing that the binary mode of
expression in Rule 702 indicates the results of an unarticulated
51
analytical framework.
Nance argues in the following terms that 702 reliability instead
calls for a comparative evaluation of expert testimony:
Much more important in articulating a meaningful content for
the reliability requirement of Rule 702, and more likely to result
in the exclusion of proffered expertise, is the idea that evidence
may be excluded to encourage the presentation of better
evidence, evidence that is more probative, or less costly for the
tribunal, or otherwise presenting a more favorable balance
52
between the two.

Specifically, he argues that the reliability element of 702 requires the
trial judge to secure the best (most reliable) evidence that is
53
reasonably available to the proponent of expert testimony.
For
Nance, this approach cures many ills including, importantly, the
54
misplaced concern about jury credulity.
Professor Nance recognizes the affinity between his suggested
approach and Rule 403. He acknowledges that 403 analysis addresses
55
traditional concerns about reliability, and he concedes that as a well56
understood rule, 403 is a good starting point for 702 analysis. He
also acknowledges McCormick’s entreaty that balancing the probative
value and prejudice of scientific evidence “offers a more honest and
sensitive basis for making admissibility decisions than the more
57
cramped tests that have characterized this area of the law.”
However, Professor Nance reads the cases and Rule 702 as requiring
58
a content for reliability that is distinctive from 403 analysis.
A
50

Nance, supra note 39, at 192.
Id. at 193.
52
Id. at 240.
53
Id. at 225.
54
Id. at 227.
55
Id. at 224 (identifying concerns about jury ability to properly assess probative
value, conservation of jury and fact-finder resources, and the availability of better
evidence).
56
Nance, supra note 226.
57
Id. at 220 (referring to 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 203).
58
Referring to the quote from MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, Nance says, “How then
shall we complete the analysis in such a way as to give due respect to the teachings of
51
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careful search of Daubert yields little support for such a view. Indeed,
Nance, in dispelling the notion of jury credulity and advocating the
use of 403, points to the Daubert language affirming the role of 403 in
59
excluding unduly prejudicial, confusing or misleading evidence. By
reminding trial judges “assessing a proffer of expert scientific
testimony under Rule 702” to be mindful of other applicable rules,
the Court affirms a relationship between 702 and 403 and endorses
the following view of Judge Weinstein:
Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the
judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force
under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over
experts than over lay witnesses. The judge may insist, for
example, on strong guarantees that tests relied on by an expert
were properly conducted since a careless laboratory is a terrible
60
hazard to justice.

The insistence on the proper conduct of tests that Judge Weinstein
described in the example seems to be an effort to establish the
reliability (probative value) of the expert’s testimony.
The
counterweight of possible prejudice that might lead to exclusion
under 403 is what makes the admissibility finding essentially the same
as the sufficient reliability finding under 702. It is this analysis,
endorsed by the Daubert Court, that Judge Weinstein used in the
Agent Orange litigation, where he excluded animal studies with the
following reasoning:
There is no evidence that plaintiffs were exposed to the far higher
concentrations involved in both the animal and industrial
exposure studies. The animal studies are not helpful in the
instant cases because they involve different biological species.
They are of so little probative force and are so potentially
61
misleading as to be inadmissible.

In this pre-Daubert case, Judge Weinstein, discussing the trend toward
replacing Frye analysis with 702 analysis, said that the “general
acceptance” standard governing the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence had been replaced by “a balancing of the relevance,
reliability, and helpfulness of the evidence against the likelihood of
the Supreme Court and the mandate of Congress in amended Rule 702?” Id.
59
509 U.S. at 595.
60
Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not
Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1992). The Court’s endorsement of this view also
seems to evince a concern about jury credulity that Professor Nance perceived in the
Court’s opinion. See Nance, supra note 39, at 227-28.
61
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).
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waste of time, confusion and prejudice.” Judge Weinstein
elaborated, “[w]hen either the expert’s qualification or his testimony
lie at the periphery of what the scientific community considers
acceptable, special care should be exercised in evaluating the
reliability and probative worth of the proffered testimony under
63
Rules 703 and 403.” This discussion explicitly links reliability and
probative value as part of the 403 analysis. Indeed, Professor Nance
points to this connection in making the observation that “expertise
that is very unreliable may be excluded under Rule 403 as simply a
64
waste of time.”
Yet the reliability determination under 702 does involve a
distinct brand of 403 analysis. Expert testimony raises a special
concern under 403, because its terms must apply to specialized
knowledge rather than lay knowledge.
And reliability is an
idiosyncratic measure of expert testimony’s probative value. Daubert’s
five-factor reliability analysis purports to help judges ask the right
questions in assessing the probative value of expert testimony. It is
one thing to determine the probative value of an earlier similar theft
65
offered to show the existence of intent to commit a charged theft.
Judges can focus on the similarity of the circumstances and other
factors and reach a fairly routine assessment of probative value. It is
quite another to determine the probative value of an opinion that
Bendectin can cause birth defects based partially on the reanalysis of
66
previously published epidemiological studies. The Daubert and 702
factors help judges to conduct that more complicated assessment of
probative value.
Moreover, the potential for unfair prejudice and misleading the
67
jury always lurks with the admission of expert testimony. As already
noted, Professor Nance points out that expert testimony might be
68
excluded under 403 “as simply a waste of time.” He also observes
that expert testimony may require “greater judicial management or
69
monitoring.” Why this heightened burden? Nance cites the risk
62

611 F. Supp at 1242.
Id.
64
Nance, supra note 39, at 231.
65
See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978).
66
See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (involving birth defects caused by
Bendectin).
67
See Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard, 35 F.3d at 717 (3d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); In re “Agent
Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
68
Nance, supra note 39, at 231.
69
Id. at 232. Judge Becker identifies this concern as an independent 403
concern that does not involve an overlap with 702. See supra note 46 and
63
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factors of greater manipulability and the “production” of expert
testimony, characteristics of expert testimony that are checked in
70
non-expert testimony by the requirement of personal knowledge.
Using the reliability factors as tools, Daubert insists upon a balancing
analysis that recognizes the special probative components of expert
testimony as well as the inherent risks associated with such testimony.
The specialized character of 403 analysis involving expert
testimony (the use of Daubert factors) is one reason that the 702
reliability overlay is distinctive from the 403 analysis of non-expert
71
testimony. A second reason is the burden of proof. The opponent
accompanying text.
70
Responding to his own question concerning the need for heightened scrutiny
of expert testimony, Nance reasons:
I am inclined to believe that the answer lies in the greater
manipulability of such evidence, as compared to most non-expert
testimony. The supply of non-expert testimony, limited as it is by the
requirement of first-hand or “personal” knowledge, tends to be fixed
by the litigated events. Typically, only a small number of persons will
have witnessed the events being litigated. For practical purposes,
expert testimony knows no such limitation. When a matter is thought
by counsel to be amenable to expert assistance, there are often
numerous specializations and hundreds or thousands of practitioners
thereof who might be called to testify. Data can often be gathered and
experiments can sometimes be conducted in anticipation of trial. Put
simply, expert testimony is produced in a way that most non-expert
testimony is not, coaching of lay witnesses notwithstanding. And there
are obvious and powerful distorting and biasing forces at work in this
production process, much of which occurs after the events being
litigated and with an eye toward trial.
Nance, supra note 39, at 232 (footnotes omitted).
71
In advocating a standard not simply redundant of Rule 403 Professor Nance
cites a familiar principle of statutory construction and expresses skepticism that the
Supreme Court in Daubert simply intended “to deliver the message that trial courts
have been improperly applying Rule 403 in the context of expert testimony.” Id. at
226. However, 702 viewed as a specialized application of 403 is not simply redundant
of the typical 403 analysis. The difference lies in the nature of the evidence rather
than the rule. Nance acknowledges the propriety of a heightened burden for the
admissibility of expert testimony because of its “greater manipulability” when
compared to non-expert testimony. Id. at 232. The Court in Daubert evinces a similar
concern about the vulnerability of the jury in the face of expertise, when it
enunciated criteria that would insulate the jury from this undue influence by
safeguarding reliability. The Court generated the Daubert factors, even though it
dismissed concerns about the abandonment of the Frye test as growing out of an
“overly pessimistic [view] about the capabilities of the jury.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59596; see Nance, supra note 39, at 228. Perhaps most importantly, the Court adopted
Judge Weinstein’s observation about the powerful and misleading quality of expert
evidence and the greater control that Rule 403 gives judges over experts than nonexperts. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Moreover, as Judge Becker suggested in Downing
“[t]he degree to which an unwarranted ‘aura of reliability’ attaches to scientific
evidence will naturally vary with the type of evidence.” 753 F.2d at 1239. While jury
credulity may not be a significant problem with scientific trace evidence, see Dale A.
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of admissibility has the burden of persuasion in cases dealing with
72
non-expert testimony. This is a heavy burden, since the rule favors
73
admissibility and the opponent bears the risk of non-persuasion.
However, the proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of
74
proving sufficient reliability to offset 403 risks.
The balancing
75
standard under 403 does not change. But, if the judge is at or below
equipoise in determining whether the testimony sufficiently offsets
those risks to warrant admitting the testimony, the proponent loses
and the evidence is excluded. This heightened burden on the
proponent of expert testimony under 702 eases the exclusion burden
76
of the opponent under 403.
It is also easier to see under a 403 analysis that the 403 dangers
set a minimum threshold of reliability, one that does not fit Professor
Nance’s description of “an invariant threshold that applies across
77
disciplines and across litigation contexts.” Rather, it varies with the
Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace
Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002), it may well be a substantial problem with polygraph
evidence.
See discussion of the polygraph cases, infra notes 125-43 and
accompanying text.
72
See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL §
403.02[1] (8th ed. 2002) (describing rule 403 as creating a presumption); see also
ALLEN, supra note 1, at 873 (explaining the operation of presumptions that shift the
burden of proof to the opponent of the evidence).
73
2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 4, § 336.
74
See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS STATISTICS AND
RESEARCH ISSUES § 1-3.1.2 (2002).
75
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states, “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED.
R. EVID. 403.
76
Nance applauds this function of the burden of proof under 702 in placing the
“stricter demands of Daubert [and] Kumho Tire” on the proponent of expert
testimony. Nance, supra note 39, at 235. However, for Nance this burden would only
seem to be triggered where the proponent fails to offer more reliable expertise.
Noting that the proponent has the burden to establish reliability, Nance says:
Applying this idea here, if the trial judge concludes that the challenged
expertise is discernibly less reliable than other expertise offered by the
proponent, then the burden would rest on the proponent to convince
the judge that it would be a mistake to ignore the challenged expertise
because its consideration will materially assist the trier of fact to render
an appropriate verdict within the constraints imposed by the process of
trial. Doubt on the matter would be resolved in favor of exclusion,
reversing the burden as compared to Rule 403. Distinguishing this
analysis from that of Rule 403 would help to maintain the
representational viewpoint described earlier.
Id.
77
Id. at 221.
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78

characteristics of each proffer.
The idea of a specialized 403 analysis is not inconsistent with
Professor Nance’s better evidence principle. While carefully crafting
his argument for a distinctive analysis of reliability under 702,
Professor Nance rejects a standard that is “simply redundant of Rule
79
403.” He dismisses the notion that the Supreme Court in Daubert
simply “intend[ed] to deliver the message that trial courts have been
improperly applying Rule 403 in the context of expert testimony” and
notes a “general consensus that Daubert did not adopt the position
80
advanced most conspicuously by Dean McCormick.”
For Nance
what gives meaningful content to the reliability requirement of 702
“is the idea that evidence may be excluded to encourage the
presentation of better evidence, evidence that is more probative or
less costly for the tribunal, or otherwise presenting a more favorable
81
balance between the two.” He notes that “[t]his idea is present in a
82
wide variety of rules, including Rule 403.” Indeed, the ACN for 403
concludes with the following sentence: “The availability of other
means of proof may also be an appropriate factor [in reaching a
83
decision whether to exclude evidence under 403].” Professor Nance
makes a persuasive case for giving prominence to the existence of
84
better evidence in reaching the reliability determination. However,
the analysis is likely to be less confusing to judges and more faithful
to the spirit of Daubert, Kumho, and the 702 amendments if its 403
78

This observation also has implications for Nance’s view that in the absence of
available alternatives, the court should admit the proffer. See David L. Faigman,
Expert Evidence in Flatland: The Geometry of a World Without Scientific Culture, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 253 (2003).
79
Nance, supra note 39, at 226.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 240.
82
In noting support for this point, Nance cites United States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S.
172 (1997), which applied this understanding of 403 to hold that the trial court
abused its discretion by not accepting a less prejudicial stipulation rather than the
more prejudicial conviction record of the defendant. It should be noted that the
existence of a better evidence alternative in Old Chief reduced the probative value of
the prosecutor’s submission, making exclusion more likely under 403, much like the
absence of Daubert factors in a 702 reliability ruling might operate.
83
See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1243 (“The availability of other methods that would
serve the purposes for which the appellant seeks to introduce expert testimony may
also serve to justify exclusion under Rule 403 . . . .”).
84
Professor Nance bases this reliability requirement on the courts’ “need to be
demanding consumers of expertise, especially those kinds of expertise that find their
reason for existence in the demand for expert testimony.” Nance, supra note 39, at
240. He adds that the better evidence consideration “represents the primary, if not
exclusive argument structure appropriate for the reliability inquiry of Rule 702.” Id.
at 241.
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provenance is clear.
Professors David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, and
Joseph Sanders have adopted a similar better evidence principle:
[W]e do endorse a better evidence principle in our analyses of
certain issues in the law of expert testimony. That is to say, we
believe that there are circumstances in which a court properly
may exclude proffered evidence when other evidence of greater
85
probative value is or should be available.

Like Nance, these professors believe that a better evidence principle
will produce the beneficial effects of increased accuracy in factfinding
86
as well as enhanced research and expert knowledge.
While they describe Daubert as raising the bar to admissibility by
87
placing a heavier cognitive burden on judges, they quote Judge
Weinstein’s analysis in the Agent Orange litigation as an example of
88
courts requiring better evidence.
As already pointed out, Judge
Weinstein in that case used a 403 analysis in ruling the animal studies
89
inadmissible.
Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried in A Final Comment—The
90
Importance of the Procedural Framework, responds to the better evidence
principle proposed by Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks and Sanders,
taking delight in their rejection of a “best evidence test” and agreeing
with their analytical outcomes in exemplary cases where they applied
91
the better evidence principle.
However, Professor Imwinkereid
argues that such a better evidence principle is unnecessary to the
analysis and that the announcement of a better evidence principle
“further complicate[s] the analysis of the admissibility of scientific
92
testimony.”
In nicely setting forth the procedural elements of
judicial reliability factfinding under 104(a), Imwinkelried
acknowledges the significance to this inquiry of the presence of
93
better evidence. He also indicates that the judge, in accordance
with 104(a), evaluates the proponent’s foundation, laid “as a means

85

David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 654 (2000) (emphasis in the
original).
86
Id. at 667.
87
Id. at 656.
88
Id. at 659.
89
See In re “Agent Orange,” 611 F. Supp. at 1241.
90
Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Final Comment—The Importance of the Procedural
Framework, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 669 (2000).
91
Id. at 669.
92
Id. at 670.
93
Id. at 678-79
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to the end of ensuring reliability,” for sufficient probative value.
Though Professor Imwinkelried does not mention 403 in this piece, it
96
is implicit in his discussion.
Professor Michael H. Graham in The Expert Witness Predicament:
Determining ‘Reliable’ Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and
97
Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, identifies
two meanings of the term “reliable” as used in Daubert and Kumho: (1)
“‘reliable’ . . . taken to mean that the explanative theory [theory,
technique, reasoning, methodology, etc.] actually works, i.e.,
98
produces a correct, accurate, truthful, or valid conclusion,” and (2)
“‘reliable’ refer[ring] to meriting confidence worthy of dependence
or reliance, i.e., possesses sufficient assurance of correctness to
99
warrant acceptance by the trier of fact.”
He notes that the two
definitions call for separate analyses and criticizes both Daubert and
100
Kumho for creating confusion by using both meanings.
While
approving of the trial and appellate courts’ apparent favoring of the
second definition, Graham never identifies that definition as part of
101
the assessment of probative value in the 403 analysis.
94

Id. at 671.
Id. at 675.
96
In an earlier article to which Faigman, supra note 84, responds, Professor
Imwinkelried argued that it is appropriate for the opponent to point out the absence
of the best evidence to attack the legal sufficiency or weight of scientific testimony,
but not its admissibility—“either an order of preference among types of proffered
scientific evidence or a regulation of the sufficiency of the foundation for proffered
scientific testimony.” Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should The Courts Incorporate A Best
Evidence Rule Into The Standard Determining The Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?:
Enough Is Enough Even When It Is Not The Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 49 (1999).
In that article Professor Imwinkelried expressed the link between the reliability
foundational requirement and probative value as follows:
Faced with a foundational objection, the trial judge must determine
whether the proponent’s predicate has enough probative worth to
justify the proffered opinion. The judge can make that determination
if he or she decides whether the expert has properly applied the
scientific methodologies and, if so, how significant the expert’s
findings are.
Id. at 47.
97
Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining ‘Reliable’ Under
the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 (2000).
98
Id. at 319, 336.
99
Id. at 336.
100
Id. at 336-37.
101
Professor Nance endorses Professor Graham’s approval of the second
definition as a variable rather than dichotomous approach to reliability. Nance,
supra note 39, at 222. However, Nance ultimately finds Graham’s “sufficient
assurances” definition unsatisfactory due to the risk of confusion with “sufficiency,”
its affinity with the Frye test and its problems, and its failure to account for the better
95
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In Daubert: Interpreting The Federal Rules of Evidence, Professor
Paul C. Giannelli argued that a relevancy approach that would treat
reliability as an aspect of probative value “differs significantly from
the reliability approach adopted in Daubert and it does not depend on
103
Rule 702.”
Professor Giannelli’s rejection of the relevancy
approach appears to be based in part on Professor Strong’s
articulation of it as follows:
[S]cientific evidence, like other evidence, requires the striking of
a balance between the probative worth of the evidence and its
capacity to confuse or prejudice the jury . . . . [I]n the case of
scientific evidence the court will generally be forced to accept the
probative value of the evidence as what a qualified expert testifies
104
it to be.

Referring to Strong’s belief that the expert qualification requirement
“was a substantial barrier to junk science”—“the qualification of the
expert presumptively qualifies the technique,” Giannelli argued that
“[t]his formulation of the relevancy approach makes the trial court
105
too dependent on the testifying expert.”
Giannelli’s rejection of
the relevancy approach is also based on three other factors. First, he
finds “‘weighing’ probative value against factors such as misleading
the jury . . . frequently illusory,” noting that a judge believing a
scientific technique to be “reliable (when it is not) . . . will not
106
Second, Professor Giannelli
appreciate its misleading character.”
makes the point that 403’s bias toward admissibility “further erode[s]
107
the barriers to admissibility.”
Third, Giannelli finds troubling the
“abuse of discretion” standard of review of trial court rulings saying
that “[u]nder this approach, it would not be wrong for one trial
judge to admit polygraph evidence while another judge excluded it. .
. . This approach is inconsistent with Daubert, which I believe is more
108
demanding.”
Professor Giannelli goes on to note Daubert’s
imposition of an independent assessment obligation upon the trial
judge despite the expert’s claims of reliability and the Court’s
willingness “to pay the price for a demanding standard, by noting that
‘inevitably on occasion [its approach] will prevent the jury from
evidence principle. Id. at 223.
102
Giannelli, supra note 11.
103
Id. at 2009-10.
104
Id. at 2010 (quoting John W. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 22) (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 2010-11.
106
Id. at 2011.
107
Id.
108
Giannelli, supra note 11, at 2011.
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109

learning of authentic insights and innovations.’”
Daubert and its progeny show that Professor Giannelli’s concerns
do not discredit approaching reliability under 702 as an aspect of
probative value. First, Daubert rejects the notion that expertise alone
establishes the reliability of expert testimony. In fact, even though
the Court acknowledged the impressive credentials of Petitioners’
eight experts, it remanded the case for a determination of reliability
110
based on the Daubert factors.
Second, if a mistaken reliability
finding prevents the judge from appreciating whether the jury is
misled, it would seem to make little difference whether such a finding
is deemed to be an aspect of probative value under a 403 analysis or
an independent requirement under 702. In either case the reliability
finding (mistaken though it is) would lead to admission. Third, even
though 403 favors admissibility, the Daubert Court makes it clear that
111
simple relevancy is different from reliability. The reliability factors
call for sufficient probative value to offset (I argue under the 403
standard) the inherently unfair prejudice and other risk factors (both
inherent and case-specific) that characterize expert testimony.
112
Importantly, unlike the 403 analysis of non-expert testimony, the
proponent of expert testimony has the burden of proving reliability,
113
This makes the specialized
i.e. sufficient probative value.
114
application more demanding than the routine 403 balancing rule.
Finally, having the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, we know that the trial
court’s reliability determination, like the 403 determination, is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard that insulates a judge’s
115
decision to admit or exclude evidence.
In their excellent treatise, Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and
Sanders noted that the Daubert Court “devoted relatively little
attention to the balance of probative value and unfair prejudice
116
encapsulated in Rule 403.”
They suggested that “this Rule might
prove to be one of the most important tools lower courts have for

109

Id.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598.
111
See FED. R. EVID. 401.
112
See supra note 71.
113
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590-97; see 1 SALTZBURG, supra note 71, § 104.02[9].
114
But see Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s
Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437 (2000) (tracing the current excess of trial court
discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence to James Bradley Thayer and
specifically criticizing the losses in consistency, predictability, and integrity of our
adjudication caused by the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho decisions).
115
See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
116
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.8.
110
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117

managing scientific evidence.”
They posit a case where the judge
might decide under 702 and 104(a) that the proponent has
established the validity of the evidence by a preponderance of the
evidence but believe that “it is not valid enough, in light of the
118
dangers associated with its use.” This approach exemplifies the role
of reliability as an aspect of probative value, whose sufficiency is a
119
function of the dangers associated with the use of expert testimony.
Kumho makes it clear that there is “no relevant distinction” in
reliability analysis between scientific, technical and other specialized
120
knowledge.
It is also clear that reliability assessment requires
117

Id.
Id. Even though the results of a polygraph examination present a prime
example of the kind of technology that is regulated through 403 balancing, the
authors add that “[v]irtually all other forms of scientific evidence present similar
difficulties and opportunities.” Id. The authors say the following about polygraphy
in the context of 403 analysis:
Although the research supporting the validity of polygraphy remains
controversial, significant research has been conducted on the validity
and reliability of polygraph tests. Despite the flaws associated with this
research, a court could reasonably conclude that some form of
polygraphy was more likely than not valid. But few courts, if any, would
complete their scrutiny there.
118

Polygraphy is potentially awesome technique that might displace
jurors’ traditional task of evaluating credibility. A large percentage of
courts and observers fear the overwhelming impact polygraphy might
have, causing jurors to overlook the significant errors associated with
even the best application of the technology. The regulation of this
technology is largely accomplished through the balancing mechanism
provided by 403.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
119
The approach suggested here differs from that of Faigman, since it views 702
gatekeeping as a part of 403 analysis, rather than being in lockstep. Under this view,
any required adjustment in the showing of validity is made in light of the 403
dangers. This analysis is similar to Nance’s comparative reliability of better evidence
approach; however, the existence of better evidence is only one factor in the 403
balance. Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.8 n.230 (“Rule 403 only comes into
play if the court finds that the evidence is ‘sufficiently’ reliable under Rule 702.
Thus, Rule 403 provides additional power to keep evidence out after Rule 702
gatekeeping is done. Yet, if the Rule 702 threshold is substantially higher than mere
relevancy, then the courts’ ability to adjust the showing of validity to the use and
context of the evidence is limited.”).
120
526 U.S. at 147. As Faigman says:
In asking whether the expertise is “science” or “non-science,” courts
have asked the wrong question. Rather, in all cases where expert
testimony is proffered courts should be inquiring into the methods
experts are using, whether expert judgments are based on
experimental research, clinical evaluation, or other types of
experience.
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.5, at 41.
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neither proof of the accuracy of expert testimony nor exclusion of
“shaky evidence,” leaving the question of how much reliability is
121
enough.
The trial court’s analysis should focus on whether the
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to offset the dangers
122
associated with the testimony.
Though this sufficiency approach
should consider the availability of better evidence as suggested by
Professor Nance, the existence of such evidence should not be the
123
sole determinant of probative value.
This approach also suggests
that smaller degrees of reliability may be tolerable, where associated
124
dangers are lower, posing a lower threat to accuracy in factfinding.
THE POLYGRAPH CASES
Under the 403 approach, expert testimony that is not sufficiently
supported by the data or that amounts to unsupported speculation
lacks sufficient probative value to justify time and risk of
125
overvaluation that its production might entail.
Hence, the cases
may be examined against three tests that reveal the link between
reliability and 403 analysis. First, admissibility decisions that analyze
reliable testimony as admissible and unreliable testimony as
inadmissible under 403 tend to substantiate reliability analysis as a
specialized application of 403. Second, the exclusion of reliable
testimony under 403 would suggest a distinction between reliability
and 403 analysis. Third, the converse is also true—the admission of
expert testimony under a 403 analysis despite a finding of
unreliability would demonstrate a distinction between reliability and
403 analysis.
The polygraph cases most dramatically demonstrate the
demands that 403 places on reliability. The exemplary case showing
the connection between reliability and 403 analysis is United States v.
126
Lea. In that case a criminal defendant challenged the trial court’s
exclusion of exculpatory polygraph evidence in part because the
121

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
Cf. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.5.1 (defining sufficiency as “how much
evidence it takes before we believe a certain proposition”).
123
Some combination of the Daubert and 702 factors will help determine
probative value. See Faigman, supra note 78, at 261 (arguing that judges should ask
“whether better evidence should be available”) (emphasis in original).
124
See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 74, § 1-3.5.1. (noting that courts appear to be
expecting better research in criminal cases, “the more likely the jury is to be
overwhelmed by the expert opinion”).
125
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that opinion
connected with data only by ipse dixit or involving “too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered” may lack reliability).
126
249 F.3d 632, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2001).
122
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judge had performed a reliability rather than a 403 analysis. The
defendant had been convicted and sentenced to 36 months
imprisonment, a year of supervised release, and restitution in the
amount of $2.2 million for the sabotage of a former business
associate’s business product that had resulted in losses of $2.5
million. The defense had been that an employee of the former
associate had committed the sabotage and not the defendant. Part of
the defendant’s proof was the opinion of a polygraph examiner that
the employee’s answers to the polygraph examination about his
involvement in the sabotage indicated deception. However, the
examiner had been unable to conduct a post-examination interview
with the employee, because he had refused to participate. After
questioning the examiner the trial court excluded the opinion on the
grounds that the examiner had “failed to establish the reliability of
[the examiner’s] opinion resulting from his polygraph examination
127
of [the employee].”
The trial court had found that the examiner
“could only speculate as to the accuracy of the polygraph
examination he had performed,” and was “unaware of whether there
were any known statistics on the accuracy rate of the methodology
128
employed in examining [the employee].”
On appeal, based on an earlier Seventh Circuit decision holding
that trial courts must determine the admissibility of polygraph
evidence by delicately balancing 403 factors, the defendant in Lea
argued that exclusion could only be based on Rule 403 factors and
that the trial court had inappropriately excluded the evidence
129
because of reliability concerns. This argument forced the Seventh
Circuit to address the relationship between 702 reliability and 403
analysis. Conceding the defendant’s point about the applicability of
403, the Seventh Circuit said the following:
While our recent case law has not explicitly retained the notion
that reliability concerns can factor into the admissibility decision,
we note that 403 allows for the exclusion of otherwise relevant
evidence if the probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the
130
danger of . . . misleading the jury.’

Citing the concerns about the “aura of infallibility attending
polygraph evidence” and misled juries as well as juries giving
127

Id. at 637.
Id. at 637-38
129
See United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1480 (7th Cir. 1992) (“When dealing
with the admissibility of polygraph evidence, and the accuracy thereof, the trial court
must engage in a delicate balancing of many factors including probative value,
prejudicial effect, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and undue delay.”).
130
Lea, 249 F.3d at 639.
128
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excessive weight to polygrapher opinions, the court continued:

Such concerns are undoubtedly heightened when the reliability
of the particular examination is called into question. As the
reliability of the evidence decreases, the likelihood increases that
the probative value may be substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial effect.
Thus, while reliability is an explicitly
referenced concern that is appropriately discussed in a Daubert
framework, the issue may also become an integral part of a 403
132
inquiry.

The court also referenced as consistent with this analysis one of its
earlier decisions where “[t]he court had examined the reliability
concerns under the Daubert framework, and determined that the
‘reliability problems rendered the probative value minimal . . .
[while] there was a danger that the jury would consider the
133
polygraph test to be conclusive regarding [the witness’s] veracity.’”
The Lea court noted that the trial court had used Daubert as a guide
to focus on the known or potential error rate and considered the
examiner’s inability to complete the examination. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that “[t]hose factors reduced the reliability of [the
examiner’s] opinion, tipping the balance under Rule 403 in favor of
134
exclusion.”
135
Like the Seventh Circuit cases, United States v. Posado, United
136
137
States v. Cordoba, and United States v. Waters are three post-Daubert
cases that demonstrate the 403 link to reliability. Each of these cases
involved the criminal defendant’s proffer of exculpatory polygraph
evidence. In Posado, the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court’s refusal
to conduct a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of the polygraph
examiner’s expert testimony. The court noted the “tremendous
advances in polygraph instrumentation and technique in the years
since Frye” and set forth Daubert’s interpretation of the reliability
requirement under 702. The court ultimately remanded the case to
131

The Lea court noted that the Supreme Court in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303 (1998), voiced these concerns.
132
Lea, 249 F.3d at 639.
133
Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 154 F.3d 675, 683 (7th Cir. 1998)). In
Taylor, the trial court had specifically pointed to the reliability problem caused by the
examiner’s use of “‘stock’ questions in the test rather than questions tailored to the
circumstances of [the] case [and] a subjective visual scoring technique in calculating
the results rather than the more reliable objective numerical scoring system.” 154
F.3d at 683.
134
Lea, 249 F.3d at 639.
135
57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
136
194 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999).
137
194 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999).
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the trial court for a determination of the relevance and reliability of
the polygraph evidence, but it removed the per se barrier. It also
cited the evidence in support of the examination’s accuracy: (a) the
office of technology assessment studies showing accuracy rates of 5898 percent and higher, and (b) other studies and rates higher than
90%. Based on these figures the court assumed reliability and
proceeded to demonstrate what factors should be considered in the
138
403 analysis, including the mesmerizing prejudicial effect.
It
considered such probative factors as the opportunity extended to the
prosecutor to participate in the examination, offering the evidence in
a pre-trial setting before a judge rather than in a trial before the jury,
and the credibility problem giving rise to a need for the evidence.
Following this exercise, the court announced that it was leaving it up
to the trial court to determine reliability and relevance.
The court’s approach in assuming reliability before proceeding
to a 403 analysis in Posado suggests a distinction between 702 and 403
analysis. Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Lea, the court in Posado did
not specifically incorporate the reliability factor into its assessment of
probative value. Rather, it treated various procedural safeguards—
the prosecutor’s participation in the examination and the offering of
the evidence initially in the pre-trial setting—as contributing to
probative value.
However, if these safeguards are seen as
contributing to the accuracy of exam results, as the court suggested,
they contribute to probative value by enhancing reliability. The court
in Posado may not have fully appreciated this relationship. The need
for evidence may certainly heighten its value; but it does not obviate
balancing the unfair prejudice associated with such evidence. In the
case of expert testimony, reliability must still be sufficient to offset
policy counterweights under 403, even in the face of heightened
139
need.
In United States v. Cordoba, the trial court ruled the polygraph
evidence inadmissible under 702, because it contained defects under
industry standards. In that case, the duration and substance of the
pre-test was not preserved, no tape or video was made of the pre-test
interview or the polygraph exam, the examiner did not calibrate the
138

The court referred to this effect as the traditional objection to polygraph
evidence; the Supreme Court in Scheffer described it as “the aura of infallibility
attending polygraph evidence [that] can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess
credibility and guilt.” 523 U.S. at 314.
139
See United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[W]hile
prosecutorial need alone does not mean probative value outweighs prejudice, the
more essential the evidence, the greater its probative value, and the less likely that a
trial court should order the evidence excluded.”).
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machine at the prison test site, and the questions were improper.
Moreover, even though the examiner found deception in the
defendant’s answer, the examiner scored the answer truthful after
the defendant’s explanation. Finally, the examiner’s report was filled
with errors and defects and was completed before the test, and
numerous other problems existed.
In doing the 403 analysis in Cordoba, the court of appeals
pointed to the flawed exam as lacking probative value. The factors
that rendered the exam unreliable under 702 also made it less
probative under 403. The court also noted that the risks associated
140
with such a flawed exam “greatly outweighed the probative value.”
Cordoba shows completely overlapping reliability and probative value
inquiries under 702 and 403.
In Waters the court bypassed 702 and “independently” excluded
the evidence under 403. It is noteworthy that in that case the
proponent produced no evidence of the reliability of the polygraph
evidence. Thus, the non-existence of probative value facilitated the
trial court’s 403 decision to exclude. Noting the concern in Scheffer
about “excessive weight,” the trial court had called the evidence
collateral and confusing.
In polygraph cases, the “aura of infallibility” that would cause the
jury to overvalue the evidence sets a high bar for establishing
sufficient reliability. As Professors Giannelli and Imwinkelried point
out in their treatise on scientific evidence, “[t]he validity of
141
polygraph testing in criminal investigations remains controversial.”
Yet, polygraph research is ongoing. The director of the Defense
Polygraph Institute noted in 1995, “the period between 1986 and the
present has been one of unparalleled advances in the
psychophysiological detection of deception testing procedures and
142
processes.” Validation studies conducted by the now-defunct Office
of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress, the
Department of Defense, and others show accuracy rates in criminal
investigations ranging from 63 to 96 percent, depending upon
whether one is confirming truthful answers (higher), or deceptive
answers (lower), and whether interpretations were blind or by the
143
original examiner.
These observations suggest that under a specialized 403 inquiry
140

Cordoba, 194 F.3d at 1063.
1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, § 8-3 (3d
ed. 1999).
142
1 Id.
143
See 1 id. § 8-3(C), at 381-82.
141
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based on a reliability showing of probative value, the admissibility of
polygraph evidence may well become routine as its accuracy rates
continue to rise. With unfair prejudice as high as that associated with
the polygraph, reliability may be nothing less than a call for the best
evidence.
THAYER REDUX
The 403 approach to determining reliability is certainly not
perfect. In fact, Eleanor Swift, harkening back to Thayer, criticized
excessive discretion in the area of expert testimony as leading to the
144
loss of consistency and predictability in making reliability decisions.
She points, critically, to all the flexibility and potential for
inconsistency under Daubert and Kumho, combined with Joiner’s
145
“abuse of discretion” standard.
She also expresses the concern that judges may inappropriately
define substantive law by controlling the use of essential scientific
testimony.
For example, judges might create a bright-line
requirement that without published epidemiological studies which
confirm a causal link between the alleged toxic substance and the
plaintiff’s medical condition, expert testimony that such a link exists
146
will be excluded.
One could certainly argue that appellate courts
or legislatures, rather than trial judges insulated from judicial review
by an “abuse of discretion” standard, should be adding this kind of
substantive term. Swift argues that an “abuse of discretion” standard
should not hamper efforts to deal with the policy question of how to
reconcile the tension between the right to jury trial and the need to
147
use expertise at trials.
However, Professor Swift acknowledges the arguments of
commentators that in some ways judicial discretion may be more
appropriate than bright-line rules in dealing with the dynamics of the
trial. Many questions coming up in litigation require “individualized,
148
flexible decision-making” within the context of a particular case.
Where cases involve narrow facts that resist generalization, trying to
149
apply rigid rules would promote error and injustice.
When it is
important to take the trial context into account, trial courts are in a
144
145
146
147
148
149

See Swift, supra note 114, at 2467.
Id. at 2472-73.
Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2446
Id.
Id.
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superior position to appellate courts and to legislatures, and rules
allowing the trial judge to exercise sensitivity to the complexity and
uniqueness of a particular case necessarily promote more truth than
150
mechanical rules.
It may be true that standards governing the admissibility of
expert testimony may not be appropriate for the exercise of
discretion, since these admissibility decisions transcend the individual
case. Yet, currently, that is not an open policy question. The
reliability standard embodied in 702 as amended and interpreted by
the court is a given. Recognizing its provenance in 403 does at least
two things. First, it leads to the recognition that even though the
standard is variable, there is a threshold of reliability in every case.
Second, it reveals that reliability under 403 may be established in
some cases without reference to better evidence. Conversely, in some
cases as demonstrated by the polygraph cases, it may well mean not
just better evidence, but the best evidence.
The beauty of understanding reliability as a specialized
application of 403 is that it establishes a connection with basic
evidence principles as we move into this area of increasing
complexity. It intertwines reliability with probative value and focuses
on admissibility as distinctive from sufficiency.
CONCLUSION
Rule 403 is a governor that requires more than minimal
relevancy when evidence presents risks to accuracy in factfinding or
judicial efficiency. However, 403 does not exclude evidence whose
151
probative value is high enough to offset countervailing risks. Since
reliability contributes to the probative value of specialized knowledge,
even highly risky expert testimony such as polygraph results will be
admitted under 403 upon a showing of sufficiently high reliability.
Conversely, if expert testimony presents little risk, probative value
need not be as high in order to scale the 403 hurdle. Indeed, expert
152
testimony may be “shaky but admissible.”
Because expert testimony carries inherent risks, Rule 702
requires sufficient reliability—substantially more than minimal

150

Swift, supra note 114, at 2444, 2446; see also Kevin C. McMunigal & Calvin
William Sharpe, Reforming Extrinsic Impeachment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 363, 380 (2001)
(discussing the preference for a discretionary approach to extrinsic impeachment
rather than a bright line rule based partially on relative institutional competence).
151
See Blakely, supra note 49, at 317.
152
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
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153

relevancy—for admissibility.
How much more depends upon the
countervailing level of risk to be offset. This is why the reliability
standard is so often articulated in variable terms—as perhaps a
154
sliding scale without markers.
Viewed as a specialized application
of 403, the reliability determination under 702 is broad enough to
encompass Professor Nance’s better evidence concerns, while
accounting for a myriad of risks, some, perhaps, so substantial as to
call for the best evidence.

153

The “any tendency” standard of Rule 401 defines minimal relevancy. See FED.
R. EVID. 401.
154
See Nance supra note 39, at 221 (referencing to “an ascending scale of
reliability with a mark that separates the insufficiently reliable from the sufficiently
reliable”).

